The Supreme Court of Japan: Commentary on the Recent Work of Scholars in the United States by Fujita, Tokiyasu
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 88 
Issue 6 Decision Making on the Japanese Supreme Court 
2011 
The Supreme Court of Japan: Commentary on the Recent Work of 
Scholars in the United States 
Tokiyasu Fujita 
Tohoku University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the 
Law and Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tokiyasu Fujita, The Supreme Court of Japan: Commentary on the Recent Work of Scholars in the United 
States, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1507 (2011). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/6 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1507 
THE SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN:  
COMMENTARY ON THE RECENT WORK  
OF SCHOLARS IN THE UNITED STATES  
TOKIYASU FUJITA

 
For this symposium, I was invited to serve on two panels. For Panel 2, 
I was asked to provide commentaries on three papers, namely: (1) John O. 
Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the 
Public Trust;
1
 (2) David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: 
Judicial Review in Japan;
2
 and (3) John O. Haley, Is Japanese Supreme 
Court Conservative?
3
 For Panel 6, I was asked to comment on the gap 
between scholarly perception and reality with respect to the Japanese 
Supreme Court, from the perspective of a former professor who has 
observed the Japanese judiciary from both the outside and the inside. 
Reading the participants’ papers, I have noticed that a heavy focus is 
placed on (1) determining the precise definition of the term 
―conservative,‖ and (2) the degree to which the Japanese Supreme Court is 
―conservative,‖ as the term is used among scholars. Furthermore, it has 
come to my attention that scholars refer to a particular image of the 
Supreme Court, which has frequently served as a foundation for their 
subsequent arguments. To address these points, I would like to discuss 
jointly the three papers and other related works, including Professor 
Daniel Foote’s recent publications in 20064 and 2007,5 and to talk 
simultaneously about my own impressions of the Court.  
It should be noted that, unlike the other individuals gathered for this 
symposium, I am not principally motivated by academic endeavors to 
verify whether these scholarly interpretations are indeed valid. Nor have I 
reached my conclusions by subjecting my observations to academic 
 
 
  Professor Emeritus of Tōhoku University; Former Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan. 
Translated by Kyotaro Hemmi. 
 1. John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public 
Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). 
 2. David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1545 (2009). 
 3. John O. Haley, Is The Japanese Supreme Court Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1467 
(2011). 
 4. DANIEL H. FOOTE, SAIBAN TO SHAKAI: SHIHOU NO JOUSHIKI SAIKOU [THE JUDICIARY AND 
SOCIETY: RECONSIDERING THE LEGAL COMMONSENSE] (NTT, 2006). 
 5. DANIEL H. FOOTE, NAMONAI KAOMONAI SHIHOU: NIHON NO SAIBAN WA KAWARUNOKA 
[THE NAMELESS AND FACELESS JUDICIARY: WILL THE JAPANESE JUDICIARY CHANGE?] (NTT, 2006). 
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scrutiny. Rather, the opinions that I provide are simply based on my 
personal experience of serving as a Justice for seven-and-a-half years. 
While my impressions have not been tested with academic rigor, my 
experience of transitioning from being a professor to being a Justice, and 
thereby influencing the present Japanese Supreme Court, may in itself be 
of some interest to readers. It is my hope that such is the case, and it is for 
this particular reason that I have agreed to accept the invitation to 
participate in this symposium. 
I. THE STEREOTYPICAL PORTRAYAL OF THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT, 
AS PRESENTED IN BOTH TRADITIONAL ENGLISH AND JAPANESE WORKS 
Among the traditional literature that discusses the structure of the 
Japanese Supreme Court, a particular view of the Court and its functions 
appears widespread. This widespread image of the Court (hereafter 
referred to as the ―Perceived Image‖) may be summarized as follows. 
Since the authority to appoint the Justices of the Supreme Court, including 
the Chief Justice, lies within the grasp of the government, it must be the 
case that the Supreme Court—at the very least—has been indirectly 
influenced by the political ideologies of the particular party in power.
6
 
This effect explains why the Supreme Court has frequently rendered 
decisions that appear conservative. Furthermore, the use of bureaucratic 
structures, and the power of the Human Resources Division of the General 
Secretariat to control the promotion of lower-court judges, have stripped 
Japanese judges of their judicial freedom. At minimum, it must be 
acknowledged that these bureaucratic restrictions restrain judges, 
restricting their abilities to function as independent decision-makers.
7
 
 
 
 6. For the majority of the post-war period, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has held 
political power in Japan. Specifically, aside from the Katayama Administration (Democratic Socialist 
Party) following World War II, the Hosokawa Administration (New Party) in 1993, and the short 
period following Prime Minister Hosokawa’s resignation in 1994 when Prime Minister Hata was 
installed by default, the LDP had held power until their defeat in the September 2009 General 
Election.  
 7. In response to Professor Ramseyer’s assertion that the LDP-run government has politically 
influenced the Supreme Court, Professor Haley offers a powerful and persuasive criticism, which—at 
the very least—proves that the LDP has not directly influenced the judiciary. Moreover, there is 
scholarly literature that casts doubt on, and perhaps even refutes, Professor Ramseyer’s assertion. See, 
e.g., FOOTE, supra note 5, at 131. Notwithstanding this literature, I believe that scholars continue to 
adhere to the notion that (1) the General Secretariat has restrained itself precisely for the purposes of 
accommodating the government’s policies and objectives, and (2) such political leeway has made it 
possible for political parties to impose their ideology onto the judiciary, effectively allowing the 
political parties to indirectly control the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Law, supra note 2. For recent 
Japanese scholarship expressing this view, see MUNEYUKI SHINDOU, SHIHOU KANRYOU [THE 
JUDICIAL BUREAUCRACY] (Iwanami Shoten, 2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/6
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In order to investigate the validity of the Perceived Image, it is 
necessary to keep in mind the following inquiries. 
First, an investigation should be made into whether a gap exists 
between (1) the institutional and theoretical possibility of how the 
Supreme Court may function, and (2) the Court as it actually functions. 
Second, as a way of understanding the first consideration, it is necessary to 
analyze how the Court has adapted to the generational changes. To expand 
on this point, it is important to ask whether the generational changes have 
fundamentally shifted the Justices’ views on what they precisely 
characterize as representing the societal values, as these values may be 
specific to particular time-periods. If such fundamental shifts have indeed 
taken place, a survey should also be made into the degree to which such 
shifts have taken place. Third, an examination into the precise meaning of 
the term ―conservative‖ is necessary. Noting an absence of an analysis 
containing the above three inquiries, I believe that the Perceived Image has 
not been subjected to a rigorous enough examination to test its validity. 
II. THE GAP BETWEEN THE PERCEIVED IMAGE AND THE REALITY OF THE 
JAPANESE SUPREME COURT 
A. Selection of New Justices 
The Japanese Cabinet is formally assigned the duties to select new 
Justices. Putting aside questions concerning the degree to which the 
Cabinet actually influences the appointment process, a ruling party may be 
said—in theory—to possess the potential to steer the Supreme Court’s 
judicial course. That is, assuming that the ruling party is able to appoint 
Justices who are sympathetic to its political ideology, a possibility exists 
for the ruling party to influence, if not control, the Supreme Court’s 
judicial course. 
The above conjecture is not entirely improbable. As a matter of fact, 
there may actually have been instances where the ruling party at least 
appeared to control the Supreme Court’s decision-making capabilities. 
Concretely speaking, cases from the Showa 40s
8
 may possibly serve as 
examples of such occasions.  
 
 
 8. The cases, which were decided during the 1960s, involved lawsuits stemming from 
movements to expand the basic rights of government employees. See Justices of the Supreme Court, 
COURTS IN JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/saibankan/index.html (last visited May 6, 
2011). [Editor’s note: In Japan, for official purposes, years are numbered not according to the Roman 
calendar, but instead according to the year of the Emperor’s reign. The ―Showa 40s‖ correspond 
roughly to the 1960s.] 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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However, this does not by itself conclusively prove that the Japanese 
Supreme Court has constantly been controlled, and thereby has its 
decision-making responsibilities compromised, by the ruling party. Rather, 
the concept of judicial independence has been one of the fundamental 
cornerstones of the Supreme Court.
9
 In fact, those serving on the Court 
have dedicated themselves utterly to, and staked their reputations upon,
10
 
shielding the Court from political influence.
11
 Moreover, as Professor 
Haley has precisely and—in my opinion—correctly pointed out,12 it 
appears that Japan’s political bodies have not only recognized the concept 
of judicial independence, but also affirmatively taken measures to display 
their respect for the independence of the Japanese courts. 
In Japan, Justices have traditionally been appointed after reaching the 
age of sixty or higher.
13
 Perhaps, as a consequence, the average tenure of 
the Justices is comparatively shorter than those of their counterparts on the 
Supreme Court of the United States.
14
 One possible interpretation of this 
practice is that the ruling party has implemented short terms of office to 
facilitate the replacement of Justices who fail to embrace the ruling party’s 
political ideology. 
However, I believe that this line of reasoning prematurely infers—or 
perhaps hastily equates—a theoretical possibility for the state as it actually 
exists. Alternatively speaking, it may be said that the validity of the above 
criticism hinges on the assumption that the same conditions that exist in 
the United States also exist in Japan. In fact, I believe that the observed 
―minimum-age‖ trend simply reflects the advantages of such apractice for 
the Supreme Court—particularly when viewed from the perspectives of 
the individual Justices serving the Bench.  
Take, for instance, the following two considerations. First, for former 
career judges, the Supreme Court marks the final and ultimate point of 
their judicial careers. Second, within the Japanese judiciary, those 
 
 
 9. This point has previously been acknowledged by scholars in the United States. See, e.g., 
Haley, supra note 1, at 113 (explaining the independence of human resourcing from political 
influence). Additionally, an examination of the Supreme Court’s history will reveal a specific incident 
where the Supreme Court resisted an attempt by the Diet to interfere with the Court’s independence. 
See id. at 119 (discussing the details of the 1948 Urawa Incident). 
 10. Translator’s note: The author, in the original Japanese paper, used the term ―kenmei,‖ which 
literally translates to ―the act of staking one’s life and reputation for the cause of.‖ 
 11. Haley, supra note 1. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 111.  
 14. Unlike the Justices of the Japanese Supreme Court, the Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court do not face mandatory retirement when they reach seventy years of age. Moreover, in the United 
States, there are no minimum-age restrictions; in fact, one Justice was appointed at the very young age 
of thirty years. See FOOTE, supra note 5, at 114. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/6
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determining judicial promotions take into account not only the merits of 
the judges but also the seniority of the judges undergoing their reviews.  
Based partly on these two considerations, it has traditionally been the 
practice for former career judges to be appointed to the Court immediately 
before reaching their mandatory retirement age. In this respect, appointing 
career judges to the Court, before they have reached the age of sixty, 
would upset the established seniority system that has long existed within 
the Japanese judiciary. And, assuming the continued implementation of 
the judiciary’s seniority-based system, a conspicuous age-based imbalance 
would result if the Justices selected from other professional backgrounds
15
 
are appointed at a significantly younger age than their former career-judge 
colleagues.  
Note that the judiciary is not the only group to use a system based 
partially on seniority. Other legal communities, including those specific to 
prosecutors and lawyers, likewise identify people according to their Legal 
Training and Research Institute (LTRI) cohort
16
 and treat their cohort 
membership as a major factor during promotional reviews. As all of these 
groups form the pool from which future Justices are selected, it is possible 
to argue that the statistically observed minimum age simply reflects the 
seniority-based system that the Justices were exposed to in their prior 
careers. 
B. The General Secretariat’s Involvement in the Appointment of Lower-
Court Judges
17
 
Every ten years, newly appointed judges go through a performance 
review that is administered by the Advisory Committee for the Lower 
Court Judges (―Advisory Committee‖). As far as I am aware, and at least 
during my tenure on the Bench, the Advisory Committee’s 
recommendations have been followed without fail. Based on these 
reviews, there are at least one or two individuals during each promotional 
cycle who are denied reappointment, having been deemed unfit to 
continue serving as judges.  
 
 
 15. Editor’s note: Traditionally, more than half of the Japanese Supreme Court’s members are 
drawn from other segments of the Japanese legal community, such as the bar, the Ministry of Justice, 
and the legal academy. See Law, supra note 2, at 1568–69. 
 16. Translator’s note: The LTRI is a mandatory, judicially administered training program 
attended by those who pass the ―shihou-shiken,‖ the equivalent of the bar examination in Japan.  
 17. ―General Secretariat‖ refers to the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court, an 
administrative body located within the judiciary. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The reasons for the rejections are grounded solely on one or more of 
the following shortcomings: (1) lack of fundamental knowledge of the 
law, (2) lack of proper abilities to manage and oversee litigation, and (3) 
lack of common sense in dealing with other personnel. I would like to 
emphasize that these three reasons are all based on a type of conspicuous 
lack of judicial aptitude and are not based on politically motivated 
incompatibilities. Nevertheless, since the reasons for the actual dismissals 
are not revealed to anyone except for those being denied reappointment, 
scholars cannot be entirely faulted for misattributing this lack of public 
disclosure as an indication that judges are dismissed for political reasons.
18
 
C. Functions of the General Secretariat 
Let us now examine the precise functions of the General Secretariat, 
with special emphasis on the office’s role as a human resources 
department. This analysis is particularly important in light of the prevalent 
misconception that lower-court judges, fearing retaliation for straying 
from the ―accepted principles‖ of the General Secretariat, are effectively 
stripped of their judicial independence.
19
 
However, prior to analyzing the precise functions of the General 
Secretariat, it would be helpful to examine two different types of 
promotion systems. 
In a system where status-based gradients exist, occupants of lower 
offices will be—in one way or another—conscientious of the ways their 
actions are perceived by those controlling the higher posts. Naturally, in 
such a system, we would expect the junior judges to show some degree of 
deference to their superiors. By contrast, in a system where the promotion 
of lower-court judges is fully within the control of the general public, we 
would quite naturally expect these judges to carefully consider the will of 
the public and to tailor their actions accordingly. In fact, it is not altogether 
inconceivable that judges in the second type of system might sometimes 
resort to bending their will in order to better align their positions with 
those wielding the public’s power. The question as to which of these two 
systems represents the lesser evil is a relative one: that is, the answer 
depends on the particular judicial system under which the observer bases 
the notion of what is just, which in turn is likely to depend on the 
particular political environment in which the judiciary must operate. 
 
 
 18. See FOOTE, supra note 5, at 218 (discussing the generally-perceived sense of opaqueness as 
to what exactly takes place at the Committee Reviews).  
 19. See SHINDOU, supra note 7; Law, supra note 2, at 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/6
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In Japan, it has become clear that, where it comes to human resources, 
our nation has chosen to embrace a bureaucratic model. In so proceeding, 
the Japanese judiciary has rejected both a structure that would allow 
political intervention and a system that is principally driven by populist 
demands. In this respect, the Japanese courts have accepted a particular 
management practice, where judges are entrusted to manage and to 
oversee the actions of other judges. This system appears most appropriate 
when an emphasis is placed on requiring the evaluators to possess the 
highest level of judgeship-based aptitudes. Note that similar practices are 
also observed within academic circles. Specifically, there is a common 
understanding among scholars that professors are best situated to evaluate 
the performance of other professors; this understanding justifies self-
governance by professors in university settings.  
Since I have not been part of the General Secretariat, I can only pose 
conjectures as to the precise manner in which the office runs its human-
resources department. While my impressions are principally based on my 
interactions with the General Secretariat during my tenure on the bench, 
there are some points that I can state with certainty. For instance, I cannot 
deny that, in addition to legal knowledge and litigation-based management 
skills, two other factors also play some role in the evaluation process: (1) 
the individual’s ―personality,‖ and (2) the individual's ability to function 
cooperatively within the judicial system. 
While criticisms may be voiced over the judiciary’s implementation of 
the latter two considerations, it is unlikely that this type of review is 
unique to the Japanese courts. Rather, I believe that a similar, if not the 
same, review process is practiced by many type of organizations, not only 
in Japan but also in the world at large. 
While there remains the question of how and to what degree a 
candidate’s political preferences can be assessed in the course of 
evaluating his or her ―aptitudes‖ and ―personality,‖ it is unlikely that such 
political considerations will play any significant part in the absence of 
some extreme views. More precisely, assuming arguendo that the 
promotional reviews are not completely devoid of political considerations, 
it is unlikely that—in today’s judiciary—an individual’s ideological 
preferences will cause problems, unless these ideologies are situated either 
to the extreme political right or to the extreme political left. 
It may be stated that the General Secretariat’s understanding of the 
outlook that a judge should have is rooted in its emphasis on maintaining 
judicial neutrality and fairness. In this respect, the focus should be directed 
to understanding (1) what exactly is embodied by the General Secretariat’s 
notions of ―neutrality‖ and ―fairness,‖ (2) the types of perspectives that the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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office would characterize as endangering these notions of ―neutrality‖ and 
―fairness,‖ and (3) the reasons that motivate the General Secretariat to 
make such characterizations. 
On this point, it cannot be denied that there once was a time when 
courts reacted excessively against ―left-leaning‖ movements.20 But, merely 
inferring from the past that such negative responses continue to find a 
place in today’s judiciary would require a giant factual leap. 
Based on what I have observed, today’s judiciary embraces a system 
that encourages judicial independence, even within the judiciary itself. 
Specifically, the Court has taken special measures to encourage lower-
court judges to express their opinions without being preoccupied by fears 
of upsetting the Supreme Court. This behavior is evidenced by how the 
Court proceeds through various official ―meetings.‖21 
Several years ago, former Chief Justice Machida gave the following 
initiation speech to newly appointed judges: ―Do not become a flounder 
judge, a type of judge who is always looking up.‖ The central purpose of 
this speech was to convey to newly appointed judges that judicial 
responsibilities cannot be fully realized if a judge is preoccupied with 
concerns of how his or her opinions will be perceived by the higher courts. 
Chief Justice Machida strongly emphasized this point, and I believe that 
today’s Court very much embraces his sentiments. For example, with 
respect to the current amendment process involving the Administrative 
Litigation Act,
22
 I had suggested to the director of the Administrative 
Division about the creation and organization of a research committee that 
would be responsible for evaluating the possible interpretations and 
consequences of proposed amendments. More precisely, I suggested that 
the research committee be tasked with identifying ways to ease the 
burdens that would fall upon the front-line judges, who would principally 
encounter any new problems associated with the enactment of such 
amendments. In response, the director told me that my suggestion would 
not be heeded because its implementation could be interpreted as creating 
 
 
 20. Examples of these instances can be observed in the tension between the Young Lawyer’s 
Association and the Supreme Court, which took place during the 1960s through the 1970s. See, e.g., 
Law, supra note 2, at 1560; see also FOOTE, supra note 5, at 127. 
 21. In the past, these meetings served as a place for receiving the Supreme Court’s messages. 
Today, the meetings serve as a forum for critically deliberating and discussing the methods of 
processing cases that are brought before the Court.  
 22. For a detailed account and chronology of the amendment process, see MITSURO 
KOBAYAKAWA & SHIGERU TAKAHASHI, SHOUKAI KASEIGYOUSEIJIKENSOSHOUHOU [DISCUSSION OF 
THE AMENDMENT PROCESS WITH RESPECT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION ACT] (Daiichihouki, 
1st ed. 2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/6
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a way for the Supreme Court to force its interpretations onto lower-court 
judges. 
III. GENERATIONAL CHANGES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Currently, there are fifteen Justices on the Japanese Supreme Court.
23
 
At the time of my retirement in 2010, there already was one Justice who 
was born after World War II.
24
 Today, there are five members of the Court 
who were born after 1945.
25
  
The generations subsequent to my own have all received their 
education under the modern Japanese Constitution.
26
 As a result, their 
perspectives differ greatly from those of the Justices presiding during the 
historical moments of the 1960s and 1970s when events such as the 
movements led by the Young Lawyer’s Association27 and the Miyamoto 
Incident
28
 took place.  
These types of differences, an aspect that may partly be explained by 
differences in the educational backgrounds, reflect the generational 
changes that our society has experienced over time. These generational 
changes have, in turn, changed our understanding and evaluation of 
societal values. 
For instance, I sometimes hear comments suggesting that career judges, 
and especially those who had served as Secretary General, are frequently 
(1) conservative, (2) on the side of ruling for the constitutionality of 
matters at stake, and (3) deciding in ways that would not disadvantage 
administrators implementing the Administrative Law. However, it will 
become clear that this critical stereotype of career judges cannot be 
sustained if one reads the individual opinions of the Justices in recent 
Grand Bench Decisions.
29
 
 
 
 23. Justices of the Supreme Court, COURTS IN JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/ 
about/saibankan/index.html (last visited May 6, 2011). 
 24. Id. Specifically, see the profile of Justice Ryūko Sakurai. 
 25. The five individuals are Justices Sakurai, Chiba, Shiraki, Ootani, and Terada. See id. 
 26. The Modern Japanese Constitution—which embraces the principles of freedom, equality, 
democracy, basic human rights, and the maintenance of peace—was put into effect on May 3, 1947. 
Excluding the Justices who are two years my senior, all Justices have had their entire education under 
the framework of the Modern Japanese Constitution. 
 27. See Law, supra note 2, at 1560. 
 28. See Haley, supra note 1, at 121. 
 29. For example, in the 2009 decision concerning the challenge to the apportionment of Lower 
House seats, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1367, my colleague Justice Tokuji Izumi (former Secretary General) and Justice Isao Imai 
(former Chief Judge of the Tokyo High Court) determined that the status quo violated the equality 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Even with judges who had previously served as Secretary Generals, the 
above stereotype does not automatically apply. In fact, it is possible to 
produce a counterexample so recent that it postdates Justice Izumi’s 
retirement from the Court.
30
 Specifically, the very recent Hokkaido 
Sunakawa-city Sorachibuto Shrine Incident
31
 provides an appropriate 
illustration. In its relevant details, the case involved a dispute over the 
constitutionality of allowing a shrine to use public land without paying 
rent. The case was ultimately decided on the constitutional provision of 
the separation of church and state. Although former Justice Horigome 
issued a right-leaning dissent, current Chief Justice Takesaki—who had 
previously served as a vice Secretary General under then-Secretary 
General Horigome and subsequently went on to head the division 
himself—actively participated in the majority opinion that ruled the 
disputed practice unconstitutional, even though numerous other Justices 
declined to join the opinion.  
In summary, the sweeping implication behind the three stereotypical 
charges against career judges is arguably an unfair generalization, 
particularly when there remains a strong likelihood that the actual root of 
the issue may have more to do with the specific judicial-postures taken by 
particular judges, rather than with the characteristics held by the collective 
group of career judges as a whole. I strongly urge observers of the 
Supreme Court not to lose sight of the above considerations in the future 
when analyzing the Court’s composition. 
 
 
principle. Moreover, in the recent March 23, 2011 Grand Bench Decision, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
March 23, 2011 (pending publication in SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]), which 
concerned the apportionment of the Lower House seats, Chief Justice Hironobu Takesaki (former 
Secretary General) wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by all of the career-judge Justices 
currently on the Court. In relevant parts, the Court held that the status quo was in a state of 
unconstitutionality. Illustrations that counter the above-mentioned stereotype may also be found 
outside the electoral malapportionment context. For example, in the 2008 decision that determined the 
unconstitutionality of Article Three of the Nationality Act, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 
62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1367 (The Unconstitutionality of Article III of the 
Japanese Nationality Act), Chief Justice Nirō Shimada garnered the votes of five out of six career-
judge Justices en route to issuing the Court’s decision. And, with respect to the 2010 decision that 
found a violation of the separation of church and state, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2010, 64 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] (The Sunakawa-shi Sorachibuto Shrine Incident), 
Chief Justice Takesaki led the majority opinion, which was joined by four career-judge Justices.  
 30. Translator’s note: Justice Izumi, who served as Secretary General from November 1996 to 
March 2000, retired from the Japanese Supreme Court in January of 2009.  
 31. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2010, 64 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
(The Sunakawa-shi Sorachibuto Shrine Incident). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/6
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IV. DETERMINING THE PRECISE MEANING OF THE TERM ―CONSERVATIVE‖ 
If the term ―conservative‖ refers to the Japanese judiciary’s emphasis 
on preserving the existing legal framework rather than radically altering 
that framework with new lawmaking, then I would concur that the 
Japanese courts are indeed conservative. On the other hand, the Japanese 
judiciary fully acknowledges and embraces the practice of judicial 
lawmaking within the theoretical bounds of the existing framework. This 
point, I believe, has been appropriately and correctly identified by 
Professor Foote.
32
 Furthermore, while close adherence to precedent is 
typical of the Japanese Supreme Court and might be characterized as a 
form of conservatism, it is not unusual or unique to the Japanese Supreme 
Court.  
Depending on its context, the word ―conservative‖ can have various 
meanings, including a reference to the political opposite of liberalism. As 
applied in Japan, and in the manner used by the critics of the Court, the 
word ―conservative‖ has been used to suggest that the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) somehow has managed to exercise significant influence over 
the Japanese Supreme Court.
33
 On this charge, I would like to reiterate that 
the Court does not blindly follow the ruling party’s ideologies, and the 
extent of the Court’s political involvement is limited to the task of filtering 
out views that fall under either the extreme political right or the extreme 
political left. Additionally, I do not believe that the Court will go to the 
extreme of sacrificing individual rights protections in order to preserve 
public order.  
For these reasons, Professor Law’s attribution of the fate of Mr. Hidari 
(Left) would be equally applicable to Mr. Migi (Right).
34
 The crucial 
inquiry lies in determining what exactly the Justices perceive as the 
―extreme right‖ or the ―extreme left,‖ a perception which may vary with 
respect to the generational changes that the Court undergoes.  
The term ―conservative‖ is often used to refer to the Court’s handling 
of constitutional issues.
35
 And, as it turns out, it appears that the 
 
 
 32. See FOOTE, supra note 4. 
 33. See the discussion and definition of the ―Perceived Image‖ in Part II.  
 34. See Law, supra note 2. 
 35. To be precise, Japanese constitutional scholars rarely refer to the Japanese Supreme Court as 
being ―hoshuteki,‖ which is the literal and strict translation of the term ―conservative‖; rather, as is 
most often the case, these scholars criticize the Court for its perceived ―judicial passivity,‖ specifically 
arguing that the Court is seemingly embracing ―shihoushoukyokushugi,‖ or ―judicial passivism.‖ See, 
e.g., HIDENORI TOMATSU, KENPOUSOSHOU [CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 416 (Yuuhikaku, 2d ed. 
2008); YOUICHI HIGUCHI, HIKAKUKENPOU [COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS] 467 (Seirin Publishing 
House, 3d rev. ed. 1992). 
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participants’ papers often use the term ―conservative‖ in this very sense.36 
As critics rightly point out, it cannot be denied that the Japanese Supreme 
Court has had fewer instances where it has issued unconstitutional 
rulings—especially when compared to other constitutional courts.37 
Nevertheless, it is important to analyze this numerical data in light of the 
following points.  
First, to conclude from a dearth of unconstitutional rulings that the 
Court is unsympathetic to protecting individual rights is truly a giant leap. 
Obviously, if there are fewer challenges to clearly unconstitutional actions, 
it would only be natural for there to be fewer rulings of 
unconstitutionality. Furthermore, consider the following illustrations. 
Regarding the 99% conviction rate in Japan, media and scholars have 
critically charged that this statistic signifies the Japanese courts’ excessive 
deference to the prosecutors’ offices.38 However, what this criticism fails 
to take into account—amounting to what I feel is an inexcusable 
practice—is that the prosecutors have the ability to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion, and therefore prosecutors often stop pursuing crimes that they 
feel cannot be proven in the courts.
39
 Additionally, with respect to cases 
hinging on the constitutionality of legislation, it must be kept in mind that 
the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, in examining bills prior to their actual 
enactment, cuts out many, if not all, blatantly unconstitutional 
provisions.
40
 
 
 
 36. See, e.g., Law, supra note 2; Shigenori Matsui, Why Is the Japanese Supreme Court So 
Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375 (2011). 
 37. Since its inception, the Japanese Supreme Court has overturned itself in only eight cases. 
This number is comparatively less than those of the other nations’ courts, an observation repeatedly 
pointed out by various scholars. See, e.g., Law, supra note 2, at 2; Matsui, supra note 36. 
 38. See, e.g., YOZOU WATANABE, HIROSHI ETOH & TOSHIKI ODANAKA, NIHON NO SAIBAN [THE 
JAPANESE TRIAL-SYSTEM] 88 (Iwanami Shoten, 1995). With respect to the 99.9% conviction rate, see 
FOOTE, supra note 5, at 261 (discussing how the high conviction rate had motivated the 
implementation of lay juries in criminal cases). 
 39. See Haley, supra note 1, at 125; WATANABE, ETOH & ODANAKA, supra note 38. 
 40. See, e.g., JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998); Makoto Ooishi, 
Ikenshinsakinou no Bunsan to Tougou [The Integration and Decentralization of Judicial Review], in 
KAKUKOKU KENPOU NO SAI TO SETTEN: SHIYAKE MASANORI SENSEI KANREKIKINENRONBUNSHUU 
[COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF VARIOUS CONSTITUTIONS: PROFESSOR MASANORI SHIYAKE’S 60TH 
BIRTHDAY COMMEMORATIVE COMPILATION] (Seibundoh, 2010); see also MASAMI ITOH, SAIBANKAN 
TO GAKUSHA NO AIDA [THE GAP BETWEEN JUDGES AND SCHOLARS] 125–26 (Yuuhikaku, 1993). It is 
extremely important to emphasize that there is a clear distinction between the issues that scholars are 
apparently asking in connection with the precise scope of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau’s duty to 
engage in preliminary screening of statutes. That is, the two questions that are being asked—namely, 
(1) the issue of whether the Cabinet Legislation Bureau properly engages in preliminary review to fix 
clearly unconstitutional statutory language, and (2) the question of whether the Supreme Court is 
bound by, or even needs to defer to, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau’s constitutional interpretation—
are inquiries that lie on two completely different dimensions and should therefore not be confused or 
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As Professor Matsui points out in his paper, the Supreme Court has 
often ―narrowed down‖ statutes by cutting out ambiguous and potentially 
problematic terms, rather than invalidating statutes in their entirety.
41
 This 
practice is indicative of the Japanese Supreme Court’s willingness to 
exercise judicial review if and when it becomes necessary to do so. 
Second, despite the points discussed above, it nonetheless cannot be 
denied that there have only been a few cases where the Court has: (1) ruled 
in favor of plaintiffs asserting individual rights infringements, and (2) 
taken the further step of invalidating statutes.
42
 However, with respect to 
this criticism, it is equally important to keep in mind the following points. 
As a starting point, it is important to understand that judicial self-
restraint is principally motivated by the consideration that the judiciary 
lacks direct democratic grounds for opposing legislation that is passed by 
the Diet, which represents and is directly chosen by the people. In short, 
the principle of democratic representation explains the judiciary’s 
hesitation to engage in judicial activism.  
Most importantly, this reservation is not due to the judiciary’s 
deference to the political ideology of the ruling party, which in Japan has 
principally been the LDP. Rather, even if a majority of the Diet were to 
become ―progessive,‖ thereby resulting in frequent passage of progressive 
statutes, we would still not expect the number of rulings of 
unconstitutionality to significantly increase.  
While this type of ―conservativism‖ characteristic has been historically 
pronounced, recent developments support the conclusion that minor 
changes are taking place in the Court’s decisional trend.43 Moreover, 
divergence from the ―conservative‖ tradition is also evident in the Court’s 
rationales.
44
 
 
 
interchanged with one another. As to the second issue, I would like to unequivocally answer in the 
negative.  
 41. See Matsui, supra note 36. 
 42. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1367 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2002, 56 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1439 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 22, 1987, 41 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 408 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 30, 1975, 
29 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 572 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 
4, 1973, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 265 (grand bench).  
 43. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1367 (The Unconstitutionality of Article III of the Japanese Nationality Act); Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2087 (The 
Voting Rights of Japanese Nationals Living Abroad).  
 44. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 30, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1520 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 30, 2009) (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 2006, 60 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2696 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 4, 2006) (grand bench). 
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In malapportionment cases, the Court has traditionally upheld the 
constitutionality of the ―disparity in the people’s voting powers‖ on the 
very rough rationale that the population-per-constituency ratio should be 
―determined by and left to the broad discretion of the Diet.‖45 Recently, 
however, the majority opinion, despite dismissing the constitutional 
challenge, took great care and effort to distinguish the past 
malapportionment cases.
46
 In particular, the Court expressly acknowledged 
that there are limits to the Diet’s discretionary powers, but reasoned and 
thoroughly explained why the particular level of vote disparities—at the 
time of the lawsuit—had not exceeded the permissible scope of the Diet’s 
discretion.
47
 In the interest of completing a comprehensive and accurate 
analysis of the modern Court, these new trends should not be neglected or 
ignored without due consideration. 
Next, there have been criticisms that the Supreme Court decides cases 
in ways that favor the public interest or the public welfare, even at the 
expense of protecting individual rights, and that the Court is failing to 
fulfill its proper role as the last bastion of individual rights.
48
 To this 
criticism, I would like to respond with the following points.  
 
 
 45. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 1982, 37 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 345 (grand bench) (holding that matters concerning the seats of both the Upper and the 
Lower House are ―within the broad discretion of the Diet‖). The phrase ―within the broad discretion of 
the Diet‖ was cited by subsequent Grand Bench opinions; as such, the April 27, 1982, decision has 
become a well-known precedent. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 2, 1998, 52 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1373 (The Constitutionality of Article 14 and Appended 
Table 3 of the Public Offices Election Act with respect to the Apportionment of the Upper-House 
Seats) (grand bench) (permitting the Diet’s ―broad discretionary powers‖); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
Nov. 10, 1999, 53 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1704 (The Constitutionality of the 
Small-Constituency System for the Election of the Lower House) (grand bench) (noting that decisions 
concerning the implementation of the election system is within the ―broad discretion of the Diet‖); 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 14, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1 (The 
Constitutionality of Article 14 and Appended Table 3 of the Public Offices Election Act with Respect to 
the Apportionment of the Upper-House Seats Under the Constituency System) (grand bench) (reading 
Articles 43 and 47 of the Constitution of Japan as conferring the Diet with ―broad discretion‖ over 
matters concerning ―the fair and effective administration‖ of the electoral system). 
 46. In resolving the issue of whether a particular apportionment level ―is beyond the limit that the 
Diet could set pursuant to its statutory authority,‖ the Supreme Court has extensively inquired and 
investigated into the specific ways that the Lower House has acted on its authority prior to issuing the 
Court’s rulings. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 30, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1520 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 30, 2009) (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 
4, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2696 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 4, 2006) (grand 
bench). 
 47. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
2696 (The Constitutionality of the Allocation of the Upper-House Seats). 
 48. Numerous Japanese scholars have taken this position. See, e.g., WATANABE, ETOH & 
ODANAKA, supra note 38. 
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Many people recognize that individual rights are important to society 
and therefore cannot be and should not be denied. With respect to this 
sentiment, the Supreme Court is no different in embracing such 
ideals. However, individual liberties do not exist without regard to the 
rights of the public, and the two sometimes-competing sets of rights must 
be assessed in relation to one another. Consequently, we cannot formulate 
rights in an absolute and universally agreed manner, a fact that is 
undoubtedly understood by the general public. Even with respect to issues 
involving basic rights, there is no denying that the public acknowledges 
the existence of tensions between different rights—such as the tension 
between the competing values of the freedom of the press and the freedom 
of association against the right to individual privacy; or the tension 
between business and employment rights, on the one hand, and individual 
and property rights, on the other. If it is clear that a ruling in favor of a 
particular party is clearly justified even after balancing the competing 
rights, the story would indeed be a simple one to tell. However, cases that 
reach the Court are not so simple; they reach the Supreme Court precisely 
because there are no clear answers. In light of these difficulties under 
which the Supreme Court operates, it cannot be denied that the Court has 
taken great care to try to resolve matters by carefully determining the types 
of resolution that would be most appropriate for the case at hand. As such, 
a proper inquiry into whether a decision was rationally decided, or whether 
a decision lacked adequate regard for individual rights considerations, 
demands careful alignment of the particular facts of the case with the 
resulting decision. In this spirit, I believe that concluding, without more, 
that the Japanese Supreme Court is unsympathetic towards individual 
rights claims—simply because there are few cases involving successful 
rights claims—is, indeed, a giant leap to take.  
In light of these concerns, I also feel that it is premature to conclude 
that the Court is ―conservative,‖ simply from quantitatively analyzing the 
number successful individual rights suits.
49
  
Based on traditional trends in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and 
the manner in which the Court has historically drawn the line between 
competing considerations, some Japanese scholars—and particularly 
 
 
 49. Professor Haley identifies a similar point in his paper, and the professor has supported his 
position with relevant case citations. See Haley, supra note 3, at 1468 (arguing that (1) fewer instances 
of unconstitutional rulings in Japan do not automatically justify the conclusion that the Japanese 
Supreme Court is, in fact, more conservative than its American or European counterparts, and (2) a 
proper comparative study would necessarily take into account the qualitative comparisons, and thereby 
advocating that scholars should engage in factual case-to-case comparisons in order to better 
understand the rationales that drive the various opinions). 
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constitutional law specialists—strongly criticize the Court, maintaining 
with high intensity that the Court is conservative-leaning.
50
 I, myself, must 
acknowledge that—when analyzed without regard to the significant facts 
driving each of the opinions—some of the Court’s individual rights 
decisions may be difficult to come to terms with.  
However, the Supreme Court, at least in its own assessment of its 
duties, firmly believes that the Court has rendered its decisions based on 
both fairness and neutrality; it has not been the agenda of the Court to 
ignore the rights of the individuals or to pander to the ideology of the 
ruling party. 
With respect to the methods for line drawing, it is entirely possible that 
the generational changes have brought changes in the methodologies 
employed by the Justices. Recent examples reflecting such changes that 
warrant particular attention are the case of the unconstitutionality of 
Article 3 of the Japanese Nationality Act,
51
 and the Mapplethorpe Photo 
Album Case.
52
 
V. THE SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, AS VIEWED FROM THE OUTSIDE AND 
THE INSIDE 
In my opinion, the matters hereafter presented are highly related to the 
topics discussed in Panel 2. However, for completeness and precision, I 
would like to take this opportunity to focus my discussion on two central 
points. 
First, while it is readily expected and fully acknowledged that there are 
principle differences between what is expected of scholars and judges, I 
would like to nonetheless expressly emphasize these important 
differences.  
Scholars, when facing issues shrouded with unresolved uncertainties, 
have the luxury of waiting to present their legal conclusions at a later time. 
In fact, I feel that the values of good scholarship should discourage 
 
 
 50. For illustrations of how the Supreme Court has generally been criticized as being 
―conservative-leaning,‖ see ITOH, supra note 40. For illustrations of specific criticisms of the Supreme 
Court, see, for example, TOSHIO FUJII, SHIHOUKEN TO KENPOUSOSHOU [JURISDICTION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATIONS] 129–30 (Seibundoh, 2007); MASAHITO ICHIKAWA, TADASU 
SAKAMAKI & KAZUHIKO YAMAMOTO, GENDAI NO SAIBAN [THE CURRENT TRIAL-SYSTEM] 248–49 
(Yuuhikaku, 5th ed. 2008); WATANABE, ETOH & ODANAKA, supra note 38.  
 51. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1367 (The Unconstitutionality of Article III of the Japanese Nationality Act). 
 52. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 19, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
445 (The Mapplethorpe Photoalbum Case). 
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scholars from asserting premature legal conclusions.
53
 In contrast, judges 
shoulder a unique burden: they must make their decisions at the very 
moment that the issues are presented to them, even if there remain key 
uncertainties that have yet to be fully resolved. Furthermore, while 
scholars are expected to investigate the ―justifications for a particular 
decision‖ (the question of ―why‖), judges are principally expected to 
determine how conflicts will be resolved (the question of ―how‖). As a 
result, they cannot be guided just by logic but must also take into account 
what the proper resolution of the controversy should be. 
Several of the papers circulated at this symposium have suggested that 
the Japanese Supreme Court has frequently overstepped its constitutional 
bounds by engaging in policymaking in the absence of democratically 
enacted amendment to the law.
54
 This position is understandable, but I ask 
scholars to keep in mind that a fair assessment and criticism of the Court 
would take into account the above-mentioned differences between the two 
occupational fields, namely, that scholars and judges are held to different 
expectations. 
In the context of criminal law, scholars have entreated us to ask 
whether and how particular laws conform to the principle of nulla poena 
sine lege (Nulla Principle).
55
 These types of inquiries, indeed, are highly 
important and should be carefully performed. In fact, there once was a 
case where I agreed with the judgment of the case but became concerned 
with my inability to see—in the strictest sense—the precise relationship 
between the decision and the Nulla Principle.
56
 On this point, I asked a 
fellow Justice, who had formerly been a career judge, what his thoughts 
were. The response that I received was, ―If a scholar like Justice Fujita 
 
 
 53. As used, the term ―academic policies‖ encompasses the academic endeavors to promote 
meaningful progress. 
 54. See, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice 
Field, 74 SOC. OF LAW 6 (2010); Stephen Givens, Looking Through the Wrong End of the Telescope: 
The Japanese Judicial Response to Steel Partners, Murakami, and Horie, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1571 
(2011); Frank Upham, Stealth Activism: Norm Formation by the Japanese Courts, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1493 (2011). 
 55. This is in reference to the Japanese equivalent of the principle of nulla poena sine lege, 
which means that ―no punishment can be rendered in absence of a statute on point.‖ 
 56. Having participated in the decision, I am prohibited from disclosing the exact nature of the 
case. Yet, the point that I have mentioned can nonetheless be illustrated by examining the legal issue 
that was prosecuted in the case. In relevant parts, the issue was whether a defendant could be 
criminally punished for a drug-trafficking charge, even though the criminal statute did not specifically 
enumerate such charge. As decided, the Court looked to the then-existing regulations, subsequently 
holding that the proper interpretation of the statute required the defendant to be charged with a 
criminal offense.  
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asks me about the precise relationship between our decision and the Nulla 
Principle, I am afraid that I am unable to add more to the subject at hand.‖  
Second, I would like to discuss the definition of the term 
―conservative‖ as it is used to describe the Supreme Court. 
Prior to my appointment, my understanding of the Supreme Court, and 
specifically matters concerning the intimate details of the Court, was 
rather obscure. In fact, based partly on this lack of clarity, I cannot deny 
that my view of the Court was formed under a somewhat rigid and, 
perhaps, forced construction—much like the Perceived Image discussed in 
Panel 2.  
It is quite possible that my initial views of the Court were formed 
through the influences of my mentor, Professor Jiro Tanaka, whose 
perception was based off of his experience as a former Supreme Court 
Justice during the 1960s to 1970s. Or, perhaps, my perception of the 
Supreme Court may have paralleled those of the majority of the Public 
Law Association, who—more or less—believed that the Court obstinately 
acted in ways to adhere to the precedent—an outlook that seemed to 
explain the Court’s reluctance to uphold challenges to administrative 
action. On this note, as members of the Public Law Association assumed 
that the Court’s decision-making trends would not easily change, many of 
my Association colleagues, following my appointment to the Bench, 
approached me by saying, ―We look forward to reading Professor Fujita’s 
dissenting opinions.‖  
With these images in my mind, I had anticipated to face—and even 
resolved myself to encounter—various difficulties upon my joining the 
ranks of the Justices, who were reputed to be infamous for strongly 
favoring preservation of the status quo. However, after actually sitting on 
the bench, I realized that the environment was far more moderate than 
what I had originally imagined, and that the members of the Supreme 
Court were more liberal and prudent than I had ever anticipated. For 
instance, during my tenure, the Supreme Court overturned a precedent 
concerning land-readjustment projects
57
 that had been previously stood for 
forty-four years.
58
 
On its face, it may appear that the efforts to overturn the precedent 
began with my joining the Court and that I had led—and thereby 
initiated—such a movement during our panel discussions. This perception, 
 
 
 57. Translator’s note: The Japanese term, in its original form, is ―tochikukakuseirijigyou.‖ 
 58. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 10, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2029 (permitting a filing of suit demanding the annulment of a planning decision of a land 
readjustment project). 
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however, is not entirely correct. What actually took place was far more 
complex: the overturning represented a collective and gradual effort that 
spanned across generations of Justices, and the reversal itself amounted to 
an event that may be analogized by an object that, in patiently remaining 
underwater, had waited for the right opportunity to once again resurface 
above water. These types of collective efforts were aspects of the Court 
that I was unaware of prior to my appointment as a Justice. 
A problem, nevertheless, remains: insofar as the above explanations are 
not communicated by the Supreme Court to the outside world, it is 
understandable (and even undeniable) that the public finds it difficult to 
understand the inner-workings of the Court.  
It has traditionally been perceived that the Supreme Court regularly 
discourages two particular practices, namely, (1) having the Justices 
explain too much, and (2) supplementing majority opinions with 
additional individual opinions, and thus sacrificing opportunities to render 
unanimous decisions.
59
 As far as their justifications go, it has been 
suggested that these practices negatively impact the public’s trust in the 
judiciary.
60
 This perception, if I understand correctly, was described by 
Professor Foote in his recent work, The Nameless and Faceless 
Judiciary.
61
 
It is natural to anticipate disagreement among the Justices as to what 
precisely should constitute the official rationale of the Court’s opinion. 
Along this line of reasoning, I frankly feel that concurring opinions—and 
even dissenting opinions—should not be suppressed. The practice of 
encouraging Justices to write greater numbers of independent opinions, I 
believe, is the best way to win the public’s trust. 
Today, I sense that this way of thinking is being widely embraced by 
the Justices of the Supreme Court. 
In bringing to the table the ―preconception‖ that ―the Supreme Court is 
(1) ―conservative,‖ (2) bureaucratically structured, and (3) ―anti-liberal,‖ 
there may be a possibility, or even an impulse, to selectively gather and 
 
 
 59. See FOOTE, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that, at minimum, the concepts of ―stare decisis‖ and 
―the philosophy of the Japanese judiciary’s emphasis on stare decisis‖ are influenced by considerations 
for maintaining uniform opinions). In contrast to Professor Foote’s view, which is based on a 
comparative study of the Japanese Supreme Court with respect to the American jurisprudence, scholars 
have also interpreted the apparent avoidance of practices noted in (1) and (2) as signifying the 
influences that the European courts have had on the Japanese Supreme Court. See, e.g., ITOH, supra 
note 40, at 70. 
 60. See ITOH, supra note 40, at 70. 
 61. FOOTE, supra note 5. 
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interpret sources in ways that appear to verify this preconception.
62
 
However, it is generally accepted that the same fact can be understood in 
different ways depending on what we take as our baseline assumptions. 
Therefore, in critically examining the Court’s decision-making process, 
we, too, should keep in mind the subjective tendencies that follow from 
strictly adhering to, or overly committing ourselves to, preconceptions 
before engaging in actual analytical studies. 
For future endeavors, I respectfully ask scholars to put aside the 
Perceived Image prior to inquiring into what the Supreme Court’s focus 
and goals should be. Moreover, in so proceeding, and in the spirit of 
objectively analyzing the Supreme Court, I believe that it may perhaps be 
necessary for scholars not only to examine these inquiries from a purely 
academic perspective, but also to place themselves in the shoes of the 
Justices when considering these important points. 
 
 
 62. It is evident that facts—such as the lack of unconstitutional rulings; the methods by which the 
Cabinet selects the Justices of the Supreme Court; and the General Secretariat’s monopoly over 
matters concerning human resourcing—have widely been cited as conclusive proof that the Japanese 
Supreme Court is extremely ―conservative.‖ 
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